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This paper discusses the present characteristics of men and women’s expected 
roles in Tunisian society and family during and after marriage.  The relationship between 
the Personal Status Code’s laws and Tunisian society’s general mentality were studied to 
see how they interacted to create men and women’s reputations and statuses before and 
after divorce.  Four interviews were conducted with two categories of marriages 
considered: those with children and those without children.  Each category was 
represented by a male and female divorcé living in the northern suburbs of Tunis, who 
were each asked to speak of their marriage and divorce process.  Each divorcé was 
treated as a case study of their category.  Three professionals working at Centre de 
Recherches, d'Etudes, de Documentation et d'Information sur la Femme (CREDIF), 
Femmes Democrates, and Association Des Femmes Tunisiennes Pour La Recherche Et 
Le Developpement (AFTURD) were consulted for their knowledge of statistics and 
Tunisian culture.  It was found that the notion of the domestic sphere belonging to the 
wife is still strongly present today, and is reinforced by Tunisian family law.  However, 
the Personal Status Code provides financial protections to women that are needed 
because of their high unemployment rate. The majority of female students enrolled in 
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A Discussion of Tunisian Men and Women’s Roles in Marriage and Divorce 
 
 
Research Methods and Possible Weaknesses 
Data was gathered from seven interviews.  Each interviewee was recommended 
by a friend, colleague, or professor, as Tunisian culture favors such connections to 
establish contacts for interviewing.  The four divorcés were interviewed over coffee, and 
a relaxed tone was maintained throughout, while notes were taken on the divorcés’ 
comments.  Divorce is a generally sensitive subject in Tunisian culture, so it is likely due 
to this that some of the interviewees were hesitant at some points.  Their responses were 
not forced if they were not willingly given.  Though interviews potentially yield biased 
responses based on the environment and presence of the interviewer, each divorcé was 
reassured of confidentiality and was questioned in a place of their choosing so that they 
might feel comfortable.  However, the intention of the study was to observe general 
Tunisian views of men and women’s statuses and roles, so the interviewees’ possible 
hesitance and/or bias were important information in the study.  The three professionals 
from various women’s organizations were interviewed at CREDIF over coffee, and asked 
to provide their conceptions of general Tunisian thought were regarding gender roles. 
    
On Pre-1956 Family Structure and Society in Tunisia 
Before independence in 1956, Tunisia’s family model was the extended one, in 
which an individual’s grandparents, uncles, aunts, and/or cousins were integral parts of 
their daily life (Carmilleri 593).  The extended family was “the [individual’s] source of 
life, identity, and social legitimacy” (591).  In general, the family and society were 
dominated by patriarchy (592), which extended far past the home into the organizational 
framework of Tunisia’s political system and the workforce.  Under this system, “a strict 
hierarchy of status and roles [was] established based on accorded concessions: the norm 
was that each person gave his liberty to the person above him in the hierarchy, relying on 
the latter to protect him and to look after his affairs” (Carmelleri 594).  A particular 
manifestation of Tunisian patriarchy was the tendency of young couples to live in the 
house of the husband’s family, where the husband’s father held influence over the two 
until they accumulated the means to live independently (Valleu, Locoli 144) 
In addition to cohabitation, the family retained the strength of its influence on its 
younger generation by practicing arranged marriages1.  Traditional marriages were often 
endogamous, with a supposed preference for marrying one’s parallel cousin (Holmes-
Eber 50).  Arranged marriages derived from a Koranic interpretation in which “women 
did not give direct personal consent but could only marry through their guardian, who 
acted as their…representative, ” and was either their father or the next male superior in 
rank (Chekir 44).  Endogamy served to increase parental control (51) over daughters and 
sons, along with arranged marriage and cohabitation.  It also kept the couple’s social 
interactions within the same family.  Although the bride was to leave her family and 
become part of her husband’s (Valleu 144), it was still her own. 
In the examples listed so far (but for the bride’s representative consent), both men 
and women were under the influence of their families in relatively similar ways.  It is 
regarding women’s restricted interactions with the outside world and polygyny that 
significant differences between the sexes’ treatment are noted.  Women’s conduct was 
the gauge of morality and decency in a traditional family (Triki).  Consequently, 
                                                 
1 In a study of five villages in the Kebili region, 98% of men and women married between 1940 and 1945 
did not have a choice in their spouse (Valleu 146). 
women’s behavior was closely monitored.  The primary domain of women was the 
domestic one, and women’s social interactions with the outside world were few (Cherif).  
Most female social interactions took place within the extended family (Holmes-Eber 48), 
or among neighbors.  The adjacent houses in the Tunis medina allowed women to visit 
neighbors using a rooftop network (Khabcheche) instead of the street.  As such, they 
were further removed from the public sphere, which was regarded as exclusively 
belonging to men. When women did go out, they wore a safsari2, acting as a cloth barrier 
between themselves and the public.   Men went to cafes to socialize, and spoke to friends 
in the streets, as if the latter were a destination in itself.   But “women walked with a 
destination in mind, as if the street were on loan for temporary use” (Khelifa).  The 
presence of the extended family network also lessened the pressure of responsibility on 
the husband (Carmilleri 592), since he could rely on one of its members for various 
needs.  This presence also decreased the wife’s significance because her role could easily 
be filled by another relative. 
When polygyny was legal, a man could take on additional wives, so that one role 
was shared among multiple women.  Polygyny decreased each individual wife’s status by 
filling the one position parallel to the husband with up to four women3, as if four women 
were equivalent to the status of one man.  Also, due to the unilateral divorce that existed 
before 1956, “a husband could divorce his wife freely and with impunity” (Chekir 44).  
While neither the husband nor wife may have had a choice in their spouse, the husband 
could decide whether his wife was adequate enough for him after the marriage, whereas 
his wife did not have that choice.  The wife endured severe consequences from her 
                                                 
2 Safsari: a billowing white cloth loosely draped over a woman’s body and head. 
3 The limit imposed by Sharia law. 
husband’s rejection, because she was seen as a failure and sent back to live with her 
family in shame (44).  It is important to note that divorce among endogamous couples 
was significantly lower than among non-endogamous couples (Holmes-Eber 12), so that 
endogamous marriages served as a safeguard against the wife’s disgrace.  Perhaps this 
was because divorcing a spouse who was also a family member was more difficult; it was 
like dissolving one’s paternal family as well.  
The patriarchal framework around which the network of extended family was 
built in pre-1956 Tunisia established a society of interdependence, in which the 
individual was subject to the benefit of the majority, or male superior in relevant cases.  
Because of this interdependence, the failure of a single person within the group would 
affect the reputations of every member.  Since females were the family’s indicators of 
honor, to protect them was to preserve the family’s reputation in society.  These customs 
were influenced by a mix of culture and Islamic law in Tunisian society.  WhileTunisia’s 
location has made its coasts a highway for incoming invaders, immigrants and refugees, 
both the conservative inland and liberal coastline communities retained the characteristics 
of the interdependent, extended family. 
 
The Personal Status Code’s Legal Changes to Pre-1956 Customs 
 [This is a discussion of the legal changes to the traditional family system brought about 
by the Personal Status Code.  The actual practice of these laws in current times will be 
discussed later.] 
The Personal Status Code promulgated by President Habib Bourguiba in 1956 
defines the family as “the husband, the wife, and their children” (Kari 2).  Redefining the 
family after the nuclear model attempted to weaken the old family system, and thus 
lessen the strength of outside forces on individual men and women, but particularly the 
latter.  The Code was “intended to define the status of women in the family,” and its 
ratification was revolutionary in how several of the liberties it granted were 
unprecedented in the Arab world (Chekir 43).   The most drastic new law was likely the 
requirement of  “personal consent from both future spouses” for a marriage to be 
contracted (Art. 3).  The end of arranged marriage made the family’s choice of sons’ and 
daughters’ spouses illegal, thus preventing the traditional family’s influence from 
affecting another generation.  Arranged marriages did continue after 1956, as youth still 
felt obliged to obey tradition.  Referring (again) to a 1996 study of five rural villages in 
the Kebili region, 78% of men and women married between 1960 and 1970 reported not 
having a choice in their future spouse (Valleu 146).  Among those polled, more women 
than men claimed not to have made the choice themselves (146).  However, by the 1985-
1995 generation, 80% of those married selected their spouses independently, and the 
proportion of men to women in this category was equal (146).  In urban areas during this 
time, the same statistic reached 94% (146).  Though the frequency of arranged marriages 
decreased gradually despite the change in law, their numbers are now almost negligible 
even in rural regions.  This difference implies that recent generations have been able to 
decide the nature of their marriage for themselves, either adhering to the influence of 
their family or breaking away from it when their judgment deems necessary. 
The other change in marital law brought about by the Code affecting both men 
and women was a minimum age for entering into a marriage contract (Art. 5).  Initially, 
the ages were set at 17 for a young woman and 20 for a man.  In 2007, this was changed 
to 18 for both sexes.  The minimum age “ostensibly end[ed] the practice of fathers 
marrying off their young daughters over their objections” (Brandt and Kaplan 129), and 
further severed influence of the family on the young individual.  Although arranged 
marriages diminished gradually, the ages of both brides and grooms changed immediately 
after the Code was ratified.  Available statistics from 1956 state the average age of a 
woman at the time of her first marriage was 19.5 years in urban and rural communities.  
This number has risen by an average of 1.6 years every decade since (Valleu 154).  
Though the 2007 amendment lowered the man’s age from 20, there is no longer a 
discrepancy between the minimum legal ages of men and women, suggesting a 
perception of equal maturity rates between men and women.  It also suggests that the 
family’s influence over daughters and sons should fade at the same rate.  Raising the 
marital age duly increases the age of childbearing (Chekir 44), and thus the chance for 
women and men to obtain degrees in higher education.  Interestingly, “marriage to kin 
today is not related to the husband’s educational level or household income.  In contrast, 
women with more years of education were statistically more likely to marry outsiders, 
suggesting that higher education” and age of marriage “may be linked with women’s 
greater autonomy from the family” (Holmes-Eber 51).  The weaker the ties between 
newly married couples and the husband’s extended family, the greater reliance the 
husband had on his wife, and thus the higher her status in the marital dyad. 
While both the changes in minimum marital age and personal consent to marry 
granted both men and women greater independence from their families and greater 
importance as individuals, the abolishment of polygyny raised the wife’s status in the 
nuclear family.  The political scientist Salaheddine Jourchi recalls the new law’s “shock 
to collective religious sentiments” (Mezran 115).  Since not every marriage was 
polygynous before the Code, it seems that the concept of banning multiple wives caused  
great upset to the public because it was a change so contrary to the then-current mentality 
of unequal status between the sexes.  The Code intimated that one wife was equal to one 
husband in the household, lowering the ratio from a possible four wives filling the 
corresponding role to one man.  Now, the wife could have a greater claim to her 
household. 
The Code also gave the wife a greater claim to her belongings.  This was achieved 
by requiring the husband’s gift of a dowry before a marriage could be consummated (Art. 
11) and that the dowry and other assets of the bride cannot to be handled by the husband 
(Art. 12).  Metaphorically speaking, the giving of the dowry required the husband to 
recognize his wife’s right to her own possessions in the marriage, and thus a degree of 
independence from him.  However, it was not until 1993 that the wife’s legal obligation 
to obey her husband was abolished (Chekir 45).  The 1993 law entitled the wife to 
freedom from the of will of her husband, as well as previous established freedoms from 
the influences of her family, her husband’s family, and any other wives in her own home.  
Despite her accumulating independence since 1956, the wife possesses personal assets 
and her actions, but currently holds no legal influence over others, including her 
children4.  Article 23 of the Personal Status Code illustrates the respective positions of 
husband and wife within the marriage, stating each of the spouses  
 
shall fulfill their conjugal duties in conformity with usage and custom.  They shall cooperate in managing 
the family’s affairs, the proper education of their children and the conduct of their affairs, including 
                                                 
4 Article 8 of the Personal Status Code states “The guardian is the closest agnatic relative and shall be sane, 
male, and major.  The minor, male or female, is to be under the guardianship of the father or a proxy. 
education, travels, and financial transactions. The husband, as the Head of the family, shall provide for the 
needs of his wife to the extent of his means, and in accordance with their importance of their fulfillment.  
The wife shall contribute to the family’s expenses if she owns property. 
 
The loophole lies within the clause,  “each of the spouses shall fulfill their conjugal duties 
in conformity with usage and custom.”  Though the couple is to cooperate, the husband 
retains the final say in the running of the household.  It would seem as though the wife is 
to ‘cooperate’ by ultimately accepting the authority of the husband’s opinion over her 
own.  Such behavior would be “in conformity with usage and custom,” as would the “her 
confinement to a traditional role [that] places an excessive value on a woman as  wife and 
mother devoted to the service of the family, and [the] sacrific[e] [of] her personal welfare 
for the happiness of her husband and children” (Chekir 45).  The freedom of the wife 
from obedience of her husband is contradictory to her expected role in the family: She is 
still obliged to perform “the conjugal duties required by habits and customs conforming 
to age-old patriarchal traditions” (46).  The wife is to carry out all the responsibilities of 
her children’s legal guardianship without actually holding it.  While it may be viewed as 
a positive provision that the wife is not required to contribute financially to the household 
unless she can afford to do so, this special protection characterizes her as a dependent 
incapable of providing financially. 
    A similar ironically disenfranchising protection continues after divorce.  If the purpose 
for the couple’s separation was “material or moral injury suffered, but also if the husband 
insists on divorce,” (Art. 31) the wife earns a life allowance.  The allowance should 
provide “the same standard of living she enjoyed during her married life,” and “is to be 
served until she dies, gets remarried, or lives with someone who caters for her” (Art. 31).  
The ex-wife is qualified to receive the financial protection until it is possible for someone 
else to support her, or she dies.  The Code does not acknowledge the possibility of the 
wife being financially independent.  The former husband is entitled to recover for any 
material or moral damages, but is not entitled to a life allowance (Art. 31). 
The greatest protection the Personal Status Code gave to women in the divorce 
process was likely the abolishment of talaq, “unilateral divorce by the husband without 
judicial intervention” (Brandt 138).  This ‘protection’ is the actual right for women to 
commit an action rather than a limit imposed on others’ actions, or a financial concession 
others must surrender to her.  Tunisian reformers reasoned “because a husband frequently 
pronounced talaq during periods of marital disharmony, judicial intervention is per se 
required” (Brandt 129).  Sharia courts were done away with in 1956, and the Code only 
legitimizes divorce “carried out before a [civil] court of law” (Art.30). 
 
The Court pronounces a divorce in the following cases: 
 
1) in the case of mutual consent between the spouses; 
2) at the request of either spouse on the grounds of injury that he has suffered; 
3) if the husband or wife demands it  (Article 31). 
 
 
By studying the diction of Article 31, one can see that unilateral divorce initiated by the 
husband is still legal, but the wife has the same right.  Unlike before, both spouses can 
decide if the other is inadequate, and the husband is not immune from consequences as he 
once was.  The women’s right to initiate divorce is as significant in the establishment of 
her autonomy in the nuclear family setting as her right to personal consent in marriage is 
to the establishment of her independence from extended family. 
In spite of the wife’s unique financial protection in marriage and after divorce, the 
raised marital age, and personal consent to marry brought about by the Personal Status 
Code, its success is hard to gauge.  The vast majority of women remain married, and 
therefore under the husband’s will and subordinate to the needs of the nuclear family, 
which were the same problems existing before 1956.  While the field of possible sources 
holding outside authority over men has been sufficiently diminished, further progress 
remains to be achieved for women.   
The presence of such contradictory legislation found in the Personal Status Code 
is likely due to the fact that it was written three years before the Constitution, before 
Tunisia’s national identity was clearly established.  In retrospect, one might observe that 
“the Code’s…promulgat[ion]…can be considered the turning point in the history of 
Tunisia with regard to the Arab and Islamic world (Mezran 115).  After 1956, Tunisia’s 
society was shaped by a body of laws far less associated with Sharia than other societies 
in the Arab-Islamic sphere.  While Bourguiba had been “convinced that the 
modernization of Tunisian society could only be accomplished by a total rupture with its 
Islamic heritage,” the protest coming from Islamic traditionalists was so strong that he 
had to accommodate their views or risk social upheaval (Mezran 118).  One witness of 
the situation wrote, “la lutte entre reformateurs-modernistes et pro-Occidentaux ranges 
derriere Bourguiba et traditionalists islamistes et panarabes…met tres vite le pays au 
bord de la guerre civile” (Mezran 118).  Today, the Tunisian government describes the 
Personal Status Code as one “of Islamic inspiration, which has chosen the provisions of 
the doctrine of different Islamic traditions while taking into consideration the need to 
reconcile respect for the Islamic religions with the imperatives of modern life” (Brandt 
129).  But as Hafidha Chekir, a prominent Tunisian feminist remarks, the Code remains 
“un triomphe incomplet de la modernité” (Chekir 3).    
 
Interpretation and Analysis 
In Islam, there are two categories under which human actions fall: Helel and 
haram.  Whereas helel actions are permissible, haram actions are forbidden by Allah.  
The Koran calls divorce the most grave of helel.  Before the Code, only man were able to 
instigate talaq, the Koranic divorce that transpired without a court.  To be a woman with 
a divorced status brought on her by what might have been her former husband’s whim 
(Brandt 129), was extremely shameful at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Arfaoui).  Following talaq, the husband would not have had an obligation to financially 
compensate his ex-wife, and his reputation would remain relatively in tact.  The Personal 
Status Code has changed much of this:  Both men and women are now able to commit 
this ‘grave’ helel action, which the Code defines as “the dissolution of the marriage 
bond” (Art. 29).   As said above, a man now must pay financial damages to their ex-wife 
in particular cases.  However, in the four specific case studies above, the men’s 
reputations still did not suffer as much as the women’s after divorce though either sex 
had the legal right to initiate it.     
In none of the cases observed did a woman clearly use her right to divorce, though 
Karim’s divorce seemed to change tone after his father-in-law interfered.  Of the three 
interviews from which information was available on the subject, the interviewed male 
divorcés had no difficulty dating other women despite their divorced status, and Netya’s 
ex-husband remarried twice (though he had clearly initiated his first marriage’s 
separation).  The situation for the two interviewed women has been different. That Monia 
has not experienced much trouble due her status is conditional, because of the uniquely 
tolerant community in which she lives, but would have if she lived elsewhere. Netya was 
42 when she divorced, making her the oldest of the interviewees at the time of her 
separation.  The emotional strain of her divorce, her age, and the two children in her 
custody are likely the reasons she did not try to date as much as the others.  Less than 7 
percent of 2006 weddings in Tunisia were among men and women older than 40 or 
without declared ages (CREDIF)5.  Judging by this rate, her chances of remarriage were 
not high, especially if one is to consider that the rate would have been lower in 1981 
when Netya divorced (Arfaoui). That “it is still common for women to censor themselves 
in their behavior after divorce by not dating, for fear of what others might think of them” 
could explain women’s lower chances for marrying again (Triki).   The most recent 
government statistics on remarriage rates are from 2006, and show that 48,900 (1.3%) 
women over 15 in Tunisia were single and divorced, while 15,900 (.4%) men over 15 in 
Tunisia were single and divorced.  Statistics on the number of divorced men are difficult 
to establish because they tend to remarry more quickly, in the time period between polls 
(Valleu 169).  According to available information, there were 11,711 newly divorced 
men in 2006, while the total number of male divorcés in Tunisia numbered 15,900.  Thus, 
35.8 percent of male divorcés at the time of polling were still divorced from previous 
years.  The same figure for women was 76.3 percent.  If one considers the rate of 
divorced individuals’ remarriage an indicator of the damage to their reputation, it seems 
that divorced women are more than twice as likely than divorced men experience 
damage. 
                                                 
5 All statistics provided in this section are from the Centre de Recherches, d'Etudes, de Documentation et 
d'Information sur la Femme (CREDIF). 
 
 
In 2006, 68 percent of divorced men who remarried chose single women as their 
spouses, and 29 percent chose divorced women.  Single women in Tunis are typically 
more accepting of divorced husbands than single men are of divorced women.  But while 
far less divorced women remarried than men, their next husbands were equally as likely 
to have been single as divorced, making the previous statement a fading truth.  Perhaps 
these women were all from less conservative areas like Monia, were without children, or 
perhaps many simply have remarried their former husbands.  Regardless of these possible 
explanations, this statistic shows that divorced women can be perceived as attractive to 
divorced or single men willing to marry.  Though none of those interviewed confessed to 
be actively looking for a future spouse, chances are that the men are more likely to marry 
eventually.  But if either of the women does remarry, there are equal chances that their 
new husband will be single or divorced. 
 

















70,252 172 1,699 697 72,820 
Widowed 
Men 
1,112 161 401 16 1,690 
Divorced 
Men 
4,002 109 1,710 72 5,893 
Undeclared 
Men 




75,837 445 3,842 1,216 81,340 
    
(Example: 172 single men married widowed women in 2006.  
                  3842 divorced women remarried in 2006. 
       
 
The law and society’s views both work to reduce the remarriage rate among 
divorced women with children.  The Personal Status Code forbids the remarriage of 
divorced women who have custody of female children, until the latter reach the age of 
majority, at 20 (Art. 58).  Furthermore, though the law applies specifically to girls, 
remarriage of the divorced mother with custody of any children from her former marriage 
is still frowned upon by society in general (Arfaoui).  If a divorced mother adheres to 
these stipulations, she is likely to be well into middle age before she might consider 
remarriage, and the greater one’s age regardless of sex, the less likely they are to remarry.  
The women who do marry again are likely to be without children, though they might 
have to face the prejudices held against them because of their virginity that Monia 
mentions.  
“Upon divorce, custody of the children may be granted to either spouse, based on 
the interests of the child, though often courts tend to favor the mother” (Brandt 130).  
Article 58 states “if custody is awarded to a male person, he shall ensure the availability 
of a woman who will look after the child.”  As discussed above, the Code’s laws were 
written to weaken the ties between the nuclear and extended families, so the custodial 
father is seemingly encouraged not to rely on the network of women from his extended 
family, but outside it.  If the father with custody chooses not to rely on his extended 
family, he can either pay for a nanny or remarry.  Netya’s ex-husband was in keeping 
with the law by remarrying within months after the divorce, though the tension caused by 
the father’s new family hurt his son.  
Still, it is usually the mother who takes custody of all the children, with the father 
having visitation rights on the weekends (Nouira).  This is the divorce agreement 
Houssem shares with his ex-wife.  Houssem says that he would like to see his daughter “a 
bit more,” not that he would like to have custody or see her often throughout the week.  
However, he had a visitation agreement that was not rigid, so he could easily see his 
daughter on a weekday afternoon with no major problem.  Tunisian fathers are usually 
characterized as being more distant from their children than mothers (Valleu 168), which 
is probably because of the traditional male sphere being outside of the home.  But the 
Personal Status Code only reinforces this distance after divorce by giving them less 
visitation time, and thus a less active role in their children’s lives.  
The Code also encourages the same financial dynamics as during the marriage, in 
which the father pays for much of the children’s living expenses while retaining their 
legal guardianship.  Again, it is the mother who carries out the daily responsibilities of 
the children’s upbringing while the father “pays the responsibilities away” (Arfaoui).  
Regarding the financial dynamics of their married lives, both Netya and Monia 
complained of their husbands’ scrimping, while neither Karim nor Houssem said 
anything negative about their wives’ finances.  Then again, the two women were in 
marriages with husbands who had significantly higher paychecks, and first relied 
financially on the latter.  
After their divorces, three of the four interviewees were unhappy with the 
financial settlements.  Netya thinks she should have received a higher life allowance, 
though she was probably one of the first women to receive it, because it was a new 
provision passed the same year she got divorced (Brandt 130).  Karim was resentful of 
the fact that his wife won a higher percentage of their marital assets, and was allegedly 
jealous of his wife’s higher paycheck.  Houssem conveyed he did not think it fair that the 
Code’s laws place the responsibility of paying alimony for children on the father if the 
wife brings in a comparable salary.  He thinks the Personal Status Code does not treat 
“modern salaried couples” as individual cases, and that the financial protections granted 
to women are excessive for the women of his demographic, though necessary for women 
of lower socioeconomic status.  However, it can be assumed that whichever former 
spouse loses more money in the divorce process will also be the one less pleased with its 
role in it.  Husbands in Karim’s position must become more accepting of their wives’ 
higher salaries in the future, if old social views of the husband as the sole breadwinner 
are to fade.  The Code must also alter its tenets if it is to cease promoting the same 
unequal roles of mother and father after divorce that dominate during marriage. 
The assertion of the previous statement seems to be a good idea, but perhaps 
making the Code’s interpretation more flexible for couples of different socioeconomic 
levels, as Houssem suggested, is a better solution.  While the Personal Status Code and 
Tunisia’s secular Constitution have given Tunisian women “more rights and protections 
than any other country in the Arab world,” the active participation of women in the 
workforce stays at a rate of 27 percent (Triki).  This reality makes the excessive financial 
responsibility assigned to a divorced father a small price to pay when most of the female 
population holds no employment, and “those who do usually make lower salaries than 
their husbands” (Triki).  An explanation for low female employment might be that 
women who work on family farms or make handicrafts do not consider themselves as 
employed when questioned in surveys (Hafedh).  Furthermore, the women who live on 
farms do not see themselves as employed because they do not hold ownership of their 
land; their husbands do (Hafedh).  The perceptions that agricultural women hold of 
themselves in addition to Tunisia’s low female employment rate show how strongly the 
concept of the separate gender spheres is present in the mindset of Tunisian society.  
These perceptions necessitate the Code’s financial protections of women, but perpetuate 
them simultaneously.  When asked what she would change in the Code after her divorce 
experience, Netya only said “the unequal inheritance.”  If there are many women like 
Netya, who blame their disadvantaged situation on Tunisian culture and not what the law 
allows, the necessary pressure from the population to change the law will not develop 
soon.  
For now, education is the strongest promise for future change, because it is the 
most effective means of establishing one’s autonomy (Holmes-Eber 51).  In 2007, 60 
percent of university students were women, and the average woman’s age at her first 
marriage has risen an average of 5.3 months every year since 1994.  The impact of the 10 
percent female majority and increasing marital age now could eventually bring about 
significant change in Tunisia’s female employment rate, which would gradually change 
the traditional separate gender spheres.  “The trouble is that there are no social programs 
to take care of children while mothers work,” so if the two parents cannot rely on 
extended family and do not make enough money to pay a private caretaker, the mother is 
the designated spouse to stay home (Triki).  While both interviewees with children said 
that they had hired help for housework, neither had a nanny.  The comparatively liberal 
nature of Tunisian law cannot be used to assume the realities of society in the family or 
the workplace.  
The Personal Status Code was Bourguiba’s top-down attempt at change in 
Tunisian views of men and women’s roles and social structure.  While its laws have 
afforded autonomy for men, and increasingly, women, it continues to sustain many 
prejudiced views against women in their expected roles as mothers in marriage and after 
divorce.  Although women have the autonomy to end their marriages, they only continue 
to live with the same legal and traditional dynamics that restricted them before divorce.  
The Code’s laws giving women financial protection are necessary because of their low 
employment rate; the law characterizes them as financial dependents because they are.  In 
coming years, the higher numbers of women with advanced degrees might provide more 
reason to change the financial protection laws in the Code.  It seems that this potential 
change will need to come from the bottom up, when the necessity for the law’s excess 
protections has diminished.  
  
Conclusion 
Souad Triki, an economist who works for the Femmes Democrates, the only 
independent women’s rights organization in Tunis, says that the increased numbers of 
women with a university education are the biggest source of promise for change in the 
structure of the Personal Status Code and the unequal mentalities that affect it and 
society.  Education will help women recognize that the sources of inequality in Tunisian 
society are in the law as well as their peers’ views.  There must be consciousness of the 
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